In contrast to the traditional view of assets uniformly improving childhood development through wealth effects, this paper assesses whether different types of assets have differential effects on child education. Our analysis reveals that household durables and housing-quality characteristics have the expected positive effects, but agricultural assets have adverse effects on highest grade completed and test scores. We extend the standard agricultural-household model by explicitly including child labor, and use three waves of panel data from Tanzania to assess the effects of household assets on child education. We correct for the endogeneity of assets, and use a Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable (HTIV) panel data estimator to more efficiently control for time-invariant unobservables and to identify the effects of time-invariant observables. Further examination reveals that the negative effect of agricultural assets is more pronounced among rural children and children from farming households which may result from the higher opportunity cost of schooling.
Introduction
A large body of evidence indicates that assets are a strong determinant of child educational outcomes, but review of the related literature reveals at least two important shortcomings. First, research on asset-child education relationship has been limited mostly to developed country settings (Elliott, Destin, & Friedline, 2011) . Second, among the existing asset-child education studies, the notion that different types of assets can have differential effects on children's educational outcomes has been overlooked. Much of the existing literature corroborates the traditional view of assets uniformly improving child education through positive wealth effects (Chowa, Masa, Wretman, & Ansong, 2013; Conley, 2001; Deng, Huang, Jin, & Sherraden, 2014; Elliott et al., 2011; Elliott & Sherraden, 2013; Huang, 2011 Huang, , 2013 Kim & Sherraden, 2011; Loke, 2013; Shanks, 2007; Zhan & Sherraden, 2003) . Even though changes in the composition of asset holdings, apart from changing wealth, may affect child education in various ways, most studies monetize asset holdings at some arbitrary market price and find a positive relationship between the monetary value and child education. An undifferentiated view of assets as a wealth indicator ignores the potential for different types of assets to have differential effects on child education. For example, agricultural assets might raise the returns to child labor, discouraging education investment, while other assets could raise the efficiencies of time spent studying (e.g. electricity, bicycle, and close source of water) and increase returns to schooling. If there are heretofore unacknowledged differential effects across different types of assets, there could be scope to improve the design of asset transfer and public investment programs. A growing body of literature indicates that such programs usually transfer income generating assets such as livestock (Jodlowski, Winter-Nelson, Baylis, & Goldsmith, 2016; Kafle, Winter-Nelson, & Goldsmith, 2016; Rawlins, Pimkina, Barrett, Pedersen, & Wydick, 2014) , agricultural inputs (Denning et al., 2009) , and other in-kind physical assets (Banerjee et al., 2015; Muralidharan & Prakash, 2013) . While physical asset transfers may provide a practical approach for programs aiming to improve livelihood outcomes in the short run, some assets could influence the returns to child labor in ways that discourage investment in formal education and hurt longer term economic development.
The net effect of asset holdings on children's educational outcomes may depend on whether the return to child labor using the specific physical assets is higher than the expected return to schooling. If owning an asset increases the returns to child labor and therefore the opportunity cost of schooling, then an asset transfer could encourage parents to pull their children out of school for household or farm activities. The opportunity cost of schooling is high when assets are complements to child labor; while the expected return on schooling is low in communities where schools are of poor quality and for children who tend to perform poorly in school. For agrarian households, agricultural assets are complementary to child labor and may increase the opportunity cost of schooling. In contrast, assets like household durables and improved housing structures do not complement child labor and may in fact improve educational outcomes. The differential effects of assets also may vary with children's gender (Burke & Beegle, 2004) , rural or urban residence (Fafchamps & Wahba, 2006) , credit constraints (Edmonds, 2006; Ranjan, 2001) , transitory shocks (Beegle, Dehejia, & Gatti, 2006; Duryea, Lam, & Levison, 2007) and household poverty (Ersado, 2005) . Nevertheless, if assets increase the opportunity cost of schooling, children with lower expected return to schooling are likely to be moved out of school to household or farm activities. As parental decisions govern most activities related to children, parental education may also play a key role in the intensity of these effects. Empirical evidence also suggests that parents invest favorably for high ability children or boys compared to girls, low ability children, and younger children because the later have lower expected return from education (Akresh, Bagby, de Walque, & Kazianga, 2012; Akresh, De Walque, & Kazianga, 2013) . If this conceptual relationship between assets and child education persists, policy interventions that transfer assets or help build assets may have unfavorable ramifications on child education. Therefore, the 'asset-child education' nexus deserves further scrutiny.
Evidence of 'asset-child education' relationship in the context of developing countries is also limited and divided on its treatment of asset variables. While some studies examine the relationship between assets and child education by using household net worth or aggregated asset index as wealth indicator (Deng et al., 2014; Filmer & Pritchett, 2001) , handful of others estimate the effects of asset ownership on educational outcomes (Chowa et al., 2013; Cockburn & Dostie, 2007) . For example, Deng et al. (2014) finds positive relationship between household net worth and child educational attainment in China, but Chowa et al. (2013) finds similar relationship between asset ownership and test scores among Ghanian children; children from households that own at least one of the five key assets-TV, refrigerators, electric iron, electric or gas stoves, and keroseneoutperformed the control group in English test scores. Similarly, Filmer & Pritchett (2001) defines household's economic status based on aggregated wealth index and finds more than 30% gap in the school enrollment rate between rich and poor children in India, but Cockburn & Dostie (2007) finds a positive effect of having a close source of water on children's educational performance in Ethiopia.
Despite some evidence of significant relationship between assets and children's educational outcomes, no rigorous evidence exists to support whether different types of assets have differential effects on child education.
The scant body of empirical evidence on asset-child education relationship also lacks a strong theoretical support. Cockburn & Dostie (2007) uses a variant of the agricultural household model and demonstrates that the effect of assets on child education varies with the type of assets.
They argue that whenever expected return to schooling is less than return to child labor, providing households with more assets can have adverse effects on child education because child labor demand increases with asset holdings. That child labor adversely affects child education is a common finding in the existing literature on this issue and enjoys strong theoretical and empirical support (Basu, Das, & Dutta, 2010; Haile & Haile, 2012) . Basu et al. (2010) also uses a variant of agricultural household model to examine the effect of land holdings on child labor in rural India and discovers that when the labor market is missing, land holding size and child labor have an inverted U-shaped relationship. The main message from these studies is that when the labor market is complete, increase in household wealth decreases child labor and as a result child education improves. However, when the labor market is missing or imperfect, the effect of land holding on child labor (hence child education) is ambiguous and may depend on the specification of underlying utility and production functions (Basu et al., 2010) .
While Cockburn & Dostie (2007) and Basu et al. (2010) provide a theoretical understanding of the relationship between household wealth and child labor/education, they do not provide evidence on whether different types of assets can have differential effects on children's educational outcomes. Basu and colleagues estimated the effect of land holdings only and Cockburn & Dostie (2007) did not specifically test the hypothesis that different asset groups have differential effects on child education. The conceptual framework considered in this paper provides intuitively appealing theoretical and empirical bases for expecting different assets to have differential effects on child education. We examine the relationship between assets and child labor drawing from the basic framework of the agricultural household models described in Singh, Squire, & Strauss(1986) . Under the assumption that child labor has a direct negative effect on child education, we demonstrate the assets-child education relationship by showing a relationship between assets and child labor. We also test whether the effect of labor complementary assets on child education is negative.
Unlike the theoretical exposition, our empirical approach estimates the effect of assets on children's educational outcomes, directly. Our empirical analysis uses data from three waves of Tanzania National Panel Survey (NPS). 1 As opposed to the undifferentiated view of assets, we disentangle assets to three groups -household durables, agricultural assets, and housing quality characteristics -and estimate the effect of each type of assets on children's educational outcomes and show that different types of assets have differential effects on child education. One complication in empirical approach is the potential endogeneity of assets, which the existing literature has not addressed (Elliott et al., 2011; Lerman & McKernan, 2013) . We correct for the potential endogeneity bias by using panel data estimators such as the Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable (HTIV) estimator for panel data. Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we establish a theoretical relation between different types of assets and child education under perfect and imperfect labor market conditions. Second, we provide empirical evidence to demonstrate that different types of assets have differential effects on child education; household durables and housing quality indicators have expected positive effects but agricultural assets negatively affect child education. As we demonstrate that the negative effect of agricultural assets is more pronounced among rural children and children of crop producers, we believe the negative effect stems from higher opportunity cost of schooling.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present our theoretical model and summarize theoretical results. Then we present our empirical model, and describe key variables and the data used in the analysis. In section 4, we present and discuss both descriptive and empirical results. Section 5 discusses policy implications and conclusions.
Theoretical model and results
1 The Tanzania NPS is part of the LSMS-ISA program which aims to marry complex consumption-based household surveys with plot-crop detailed agricultural surveys. For more details on the LSMS-ISA, see: http://go.worldbank.org/BCLXW38HY0. The Tanzania NPS data, along with details on the sample and instrument design, are publicly available at: http://go.worldbank.org/OOLZL0UIR0. Our theoretical exposition builds on the model of child labor and landholding presented in Basu et al. (2010) who adopted the framework of the agricultural household model from Sing, Squire, and Strauss (1986) . We start with the basic structure as described in Basu et al. (2010) and introduce an education production function which constrains the household's utility maximization problem. We consider two different scenarios under each of two labor market conditions; the perfect labor market and missing labor market. In one case, the household is constrained by an education production function and in the other case it is not. Our primary interest is in the interactions between assets and human capital investments in education and so in both cases we include education production functions. Nonetheless, for completeness, we summarize the results from all four cases -perfect and missing labor market with and without education production function -in Table 1 . In this analysis, we first demonstrate the effect of asset holding on child labor and household consumption in the settings of a perfect labor market. We then switch to the case of missing labor markets. In either case, we explicitly assume that child labor adversely affects children's educational outcomes. Therefore, our theoretical analysis portrays the effect of assets on child education through child labor but does not attempt to find direct effects on child education.
Basic structure
Consider an economy where each household has one adult and one child. The adult always prefers to work and takes no leisure. The child either works or goes to school but takes no leisure.
Suppose each household is endowed with the following utility function.
where c is the total consumption and l∈ [0,1] is child labor hours, 0 indicates no child labor and 1 indicates no school/study hours. Since the adult always prefers to work, the total labor supply of the household is always 1+l. The aggregate consumption good c increases utility but labor accrues disutility. We assume that the utility function is smooth and quasi-concave and the following relationship holds: > 0, ≤ 0, < 0, and ≤ 0. Similarly, we assume that the cross marginal utilities are negative; , < 0. 2 Each household faces a budget constraint, is engaged in some kind of household production activity, and owns agricultural assets (K) and non-agricultural assets (A). If a household has a school attending child, the household also faces an education production function, and is liable to the cost of schooling, pq.
The perfect labor market case
When a well-functioning labor market exists, household can supply labor to off-farm activities and hire outside labor to work on its farm. All households are price takers and hire in/out labor at a market wage rate, w. Following Basu et al. (2010) , we assume that both adults and children earn exactly the same wage. Suppose each household faces a production function, ( , ), and an education production function, ( , , ) 3 , where L is total labor used in household production, K is household's agricultural asset holding, s=1-l is total school/study hours, A is household's nonagricultural asset holding which may directly affect child education, and θ denotes 'other factors' that affect child education. For simplicity, we suppress θ and assume the education production function to be linear on school hours i.e. ( , ) = + ( ). The household production function is quasi-2 These are a reasonable assumption because utility increases with consumption ( > 0) but at a decreasing rate ( < 0) i.e. diminishing marginal utility. In case of labor, utility decreases with labor ( < 0) and it does so at an increasing rate ( < 0). In other words, the marginal disutility from labor increases with additional labor. We also assume that the marginal utility of consumption decreases with additional labor i.e. , < 0. 3 To the best of our knowledge, no previous studies introduced education production function in the settings of agricultural household model. Introducing education production function may make the model complicated but the added complications help us understand the potential effects of assets and tools that are not used in agricultural production and may have direct impact on child education. Models with child education functions are more realistic because most agricultural households face a decision of sending children to school or not, and this is increasingly so in developing countries. concave and therefore, , > 0; < 0; > 0. We assume , > 0 and = 0. The household's problem is: max , ( , ) subject to = ( , ) = ( , ) and
where Q is output produced, q is children's educational outcomes, is unit cost of child education, By assumption, > 0, > 0, and we can demonstrate that < 0, < 0. 4 Therefore, when the labor market is perfect, agricultural asset accumulation at the household level decreases child labor, i.e. < 0 but increases household consumption i.e. > 0. Similarly, differentiating expressions i.) and ii.) with respect to income y gives us the following conditions. = − + < 0 and = + > 0
This indicates that exogenous increase in income or assets unambiguously reduces (increases) child labor (consumption) when the labor market is perfect. This is consistent with previous findings that exogenous increase in land holdings decreases child labor when labor market is perfect (Basu et al. 2010 and Dostie and Cockburn 2007) . However, further analysis shows that, unlike agricultural assets, increase in education-specific assets has negative effects on household consumption ( < 0) and positive effects on child labor ( > 0). 5 Results imply that, when the labor market functions perfectly, the income effect on child labor is always negative but the effect of assets depends on type of assets; agricultural assets decrease child labor but education-specific assets increase child labor.
Since assets are likely to affect household income, the net effect of increase in assets is ambiguous.
The ambiguity gets more complicated when the labor market is missing. Next, we provide a detailed analysis of the case of missing labor market when households face both production functions. 4 We view this as a reasonable assumption because marginal rate of substitution between child labor and consumption may decrease with consumption, i.e. = = − 2 < 0 because > 0, < 0
The missing labor market case
and , < 0, by assumption. Similarly, < 0. 5 Differentiating conditions i) and ii) with respect to non-agricultural assets (A), we get, = ( + )+ > 0 and = − ( + )+ < 0.
In this case each household's consumption decisions are non-separable from production decisions. No outside labor is hired and no household labor is supplied to off-farm activities. Since the market wage does not exist, the household's problem in (2) 
Because of non-separability, the household's problem simplifies to
Solving the equation (5) gives us the following first order conditions (FOCs)
iii.) ≡ = −( + ) iv.) + = +
Differentiating the first order conditions with respect to agricultural assets, K, we get
The denominator (β) is always negative but the sign of numerator depends on the sign of the expression + . As we assume , > 0 and < 0, this implies that the effect of agricultural assets on child labor is ambiguous; it can increase or decrease child labor depending on the magnitude of the change in the marginal product of labor caused by additional agricultural assets. The ambiguous effect is further complicated because assets contribute to household income and the income effect on child labor may work on different direction than the direct effects of assets. To understand the income effect, we differentiate the FOCs with respect to non-labor income y; we get = − < 0. Unlike agricultural assets, increase in income decreases child labor, unambiguously. Similarly, the income effect on household consumption is always positive as = + > 0.
We summarize our theoretical results in Table 1 . Results in case 1 and case 3 are essentially replication of Basu et al. (2010) and Dostie and Cockburn (2007) except that we use agricultural assets in general as opposed to use of land ownership as the only asset in these studies. Case 2 and case 4 are novel and more realistic in that they consider both household and education production functions and explicitly model the cost of education. Overall, the results imply that, effects of exogenous increase in assets and income are clearly discernable when labor market is perfect. When no labor market exists and households have to make production and consumption decisions simultaneously, non-labor income and education-specific assets still have clearly discernible effects on child labor and consumption but the effects of assets used in agricultural production is more complicated to understand (Table 1) .
If the expected return to schooling is higher, then increase in both agricultural asset holdings can decrease child labor and improve child education. This is consistent with economic theory of factor productivity in that child labor increases when returns to labor is higher than expected return to schooling and child school hours increase when expected return to schooling is higher. We resort to a rigorous empirical analysis to help unpack the ambiguous effect of assets on child education.
Our empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical results in that household income always has positive effect on children's educational outcomes and the effect of assets depends on types of assets. The rest of the paper focuses on empirical analysis.
Data and method

Econometric model
Our empirical approach considers the missing labor market case explained in section 2.2 because our sample consists primarily of agricultural households in rural settings. As described in 
We know that certain parental characteristics such as hereditary trait and other abilities directly transmit to their children, i.e. = ( ) + . This implies that child education can be predicted by observed parental characteristics, child's ability, assets, and income.
where ̌= + −1 ( ) is unobserved ability that is both inherited from parents and specific to the individual child and Z indicates all household assets. Since the parental ability is correlated with parental education and household asset accumulation, the unobserved child ability ( ) is also correlated with both of them i.e. ( , ) ≠ 0 and ( , ) ≠ 0. Since the observed and unobserved variables are correlated and affect child education, we face the problem of endogeneity. We assume that these unobserved characteristics are time invariant and address the endogeneity problem empirically using panel data. We start with the following simple model for panel data. 
where 1 is a vector of time-varying exogenous variables such as age and household size, 2 is a vector of time-varying endogenous variables such as assets, 1 is a vector of time invariant exogenous variables such as gender and age started school, and 2 is a vector of time invariant endogenous variables such as maximum parent's education. We assume that the idiosyncratic error term is correlated with no explanatory variables but the unobserved specific effect is correlated with both time-varying endogenous variables ( 2 ) and time constant endogenous variables ( 2 ). That is,
ii.) ( | 1 ) = 0, ( | 1 ) = 0 and ( | 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 ) = 0
The model specification in equation (9) provides a required framework for the HTIV model if conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied. The HTIV model relies on instruments but the instruments come from within the model. In equation (9), 1 serves as an instrument for itself, the within transformations 1 − ̅ 1 and 2 − ̅ 2 serve as valid instruments for 1 and 2 , respectively and the between transformation ̅ 1 serves as a valid instrument for 2 . With the instruments in hand, the final estimation of equation (9) with the HTIV method requires a generalized least squares (GLS) transformation of all the variables. 7 Conceptually, first, equation (9) is estimated with the fixed effects model saving the residual. The residual is used to run a regression on 1 and 2 by using 1 and 1 as instruments. All variables in the model are then transformed by using the estimated variance from the residual regression. The transformed model is estimated by using 1 − ̅ 1 , 2 − ̅ 2 , 1 and ̅ 1 as instruments. In practice, estimating equation (9) with the fixed effects model or the HTIV method both yield consistent estimates, but the HTIV approach is more efficient and can estimate coefficient estimates on time constant variables as well (Baltagi, Bresson, & Pirotte, 2003; Hausman & Taylor, 1981) . For comparison purposes, we estimate equation (9) with three different panel data estimators -random effects model, fixed effects model, and the HTIV model but our preferred model is HTIV.
Outcome variables
This analysis assesses children's educational outcomes in the context of progression through the Tanzanian school system, represented in Figure 1 . Tanzania follows a 2-7-4-2-3+ model of education that starts with 2 years of pre-primary school followed by 7 years of primary school which consists grades 1 to 7 and marks its completion with a national level examination -primary school leaving exam (PSLE) -at the end of the 7 th grade (MoEVT, 2014 
Asset variables
Assets are broadly defined and they include household durables, housing quality characteristics, and agricultural assets. (Filmer & Pritchett, 2001; Filmer & Scott, 2008; McKenzie, 2005; Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006) . We use the principal component approach to create asset indices for the three different types of assets -household durable assets, agricultural assets, and housing quality characteristics. Since this analysis uses longitudinal data, we pool the data across survey waves and calculate pooled weighting factors for each asset variable. Then we use the periodspecific standardized asset variables to construct period-specific asset indexes. One could use period-specific weighting factors but allowing weights to change over time produces noncomparable asset indexes. Use of pooled weighting factors has been strongly supported by a more recent body of literature in this issue (Harttgen, Klasen, & Vollmer, 2013; Booysen, van der Berg, Burger, Maltitz, & Rand, 2008; Sahn & Stifel, 2003) . The weighting factors for individual assets under each asset category are presented in Table A1 in Appendix.
Demographic variables included in the analysis as controls are both at individual level (age, sex, age started school, and number of siblings) and household level (age, sex, and marital status of household head and logarithm of total consumption expenditure). Other controls include maximum parent's education, binary indicators for school in local community 8 , rural vs urban residence, economic shock in the last 12 months, and household's access to credit and saving facilities.
Whenever outcome variable is at the household level, no individual level control variables are included in the model.
Data
We use the data from Tanzania LSMS, also called National Panel Survey (NPS Apart from individual and household head's characteristics, effects of assets may differ by income level, rural and urban areas, household's response to transitory shocks, and access to school in local community, so we discuss these variables too. As expected, more than 70% households reside in rural areas but more than 90% households have access to primary or secondary school in village. Although a majority (53%) of households reported to have experienced negative economic shock during baseline and the proportion was even lower for the following waves at 41% and 36%, 78% households experienced some kind of negative shock at some point of time. Consistent with reduction in national poverty rates (World Bank, 2015) , average annual household consumption expenditure has increased over time from 2.5 million Tanzanian Shilling in baseline to 3.8 million Shilling in wave 3.
Children's educational outcomes are summarized in Descriptive statistics of asset indexes 9 across three waves are presented in Table 4 . All asset indexes are constructed using the principal component analysis. To avoid non-comparability issues, loading factors for each asset variable are extracted from the pooled data. The aggregated asset index consists 59 asset variables but the disaggregated indexes -household durables, agricultural assets, and housing quality assets -consist 23, 22, and 14 variables, respectively. Table A1 in Appendix enlists all asset variables under each sub-category and pooled loading factor for each of them.
Empirical results
We first examine the data to verify that agricultural asset holding predicts child labor in agriculture. We pooled the data from the three waves and estimate a pooled probit regression of child labor on all three types of assets for various sub-samples. Results indicate that agricultural assets increase the likelihood of child labor among crop producers and rural households in general.
But children are less likely to engage in any labor generating activity with increased ownership of household durables and housing quality assets (Table A2 in Appendix). This finding supports our assumption that effects of assets on child education operate through child labor. With this finding in hand, next we estimate the effect of asset holding on children's educational outcomes.
Effects of assets on highest grade completed
We use equation (9) to estimate the effects of assets on highest grade completed by children 6-18 years of age in baseline. In particular, equation 9 is estimated for two different model specifications using three different panel estimators; random effects, fixed effects, and HTIV models. Both specifications are exactly the same in all but the endogenous time-varying variables.
The first specification includes aggregated asset index as the only time-varying endogenous variable (Table 5 ) and the second specification includes all three sub-indexes as time-varying endogenous variables (Table 6) . Results in Table 7 also come from the second specification estimated with our preferred HTIV model for various subsamples. 10 Standard errors are clustered at the household level in all regressions. Tables are structured such that results in the first column are obtained from the random effects model which is inconsistent under conditions (i) and (ii) in section 3.3. Under the same conditions, results in the second and third columns are consistent as they are obtained from the fixed effects and HTIV models, respectively. Results in the third column are our preferred results because HTIV model is a more efficient estimator than the fixed effect model (Baltagi et al., 2003; Hausman & Taylor, 1981) . Efficiency gain is particularly important for our analysis because our data comes from a comprehensive nationally representative survey which is likely suffered from unforeseen measurement errors. Table 5 presents the effect of aggregated asset index on children's highest grade completed.
The aggregated asset index has the expected sign suggesting positive wealth effects on children's education. Positive coefficient on consumption expenditure, proxy for household income, also suggests positive income effects, as expected. Among other controls, both having educated parents 10 The basic estimating equation is specified as: = 1 + 2 + 1 + 2 + + where = highest grade completed, 1 = (household size, age, age of head, sex of head, marital status of head, number of children 0-18, and dummies for rural residence, and economic shock), 2 = (asset index or sub-indexes depending on specification), 1 = (sex, age started school), and 2 = max. parent's education and access to a school in village help children achieve higher grades. In particular, about 5% increase in total expenditure and increase in parental education by one more level (such as primary to secondary school) have identical effect on child education in that both help children complete one more grade. Educated parents may see larger expected return from sending kids to school; so the opportunity cost of schooling may not be as high for their children and it may reduce child labor in agriculture. Similarly, children who live nearby a school may work on farm in the weekends or offhours in weekdays and still attend school in the daytime. This would lead to the positive effect of 'school in village' even when child labor is employed in agriculture. Results indicate that, after controlling for endogeneity, effect of maximum parent's education on children's highest grade completed gets more than 4 times bigger than it was with the random effects model. This implies the potential endogeneity of parental education and shows the importance of using HTIV method over the fixed effect model. Interestingly, having a male head of household adversely effects children's grade level but girls are more likely to achieve higher grades than boys. This is consistent with existing evidence from developing countries that boys are more likely to forgo school for household agricultural activities in comparison to girls who usually take care of household and kitchen activities (Akresh et al., 2013; Burke & Beegle, 2004) . The level of education increases with age but late school starters hurt their chances of achieving higher grades. Finally, household size has smaller but significant negative effect on child education suggesting any increase in household size reduces child education.
In Table 6 , we disaggregate assets to three different groups -household durables, agricultural assets, and housing quality assets. Although results in Table 5 suggest that assets uniformly contribute to child education through positive wealth effects, results in Table 6 suggest different types of assets have differential effects on child education. Household durables and housing quality characteristics have the expected positive effects but agricultural assets have negative effects on children's highest grade completed. As agricultural assets include farm tools and equipment, land, and livestock, owning more agricultural assets may increase the opportunity cost of schooling and lead to higher child labor demand which contributes to school dropout. Overall, the adverse effect of agricultural assets is more than offset by household durables and good quality housing as the later have larger positive effects than agricultural assets. The estimated effects of other variables including access to school in village are qualitatively identical to the results presented in Table 5 and discussed above.
Results indicate that while the effect of aggregate wealth index on child education is unambiguously positive, disaggregating assets to different sub categories have significant differential effects. The evidence of negative effects of agricultural assets on the grade level completed is particularly striking because it is in contrast to the traditional view of positive wealth effect on education. Agricultural assets (or any productive assets) are a form of wealth, but they may behave differently than durable assets and housing quality assets in that the productive assets incur labor and other input cost to be operational. Ownership of agricultural assets may indicate wealth acquisition but it may increase the opportunity cost of schooling and child labor demand, especially among agrarian households which have no or limited access to labor market. The evidence points that an undifferentiated view of assets is misleading. Because ownership of agricultural assets increases the likelihood of child labor in own-farm activities (Table A2 in Appendix), the results also imply that the opportunity cost of schooling rises with agricultural assets presumably through an effect on child labor in farming.
That different assets have differential effects and agricultural assets increase child labor in agriculture is a striking result for policy makers and planners and deserves further exploration. In Table 7 , we estimate our preferred HTIV model for various sub-samples to identify the potential mechanism behind the differential effects of different types of assets. We estimate the model for eight different sub-samples -rural, urban, crop producers, livestock keepers, boys, girls, poor, nonpoor -and results indicate that different types of assets have differential effects among rural children or children from crop producers. Although aggregated asset index has positive effects on child education in both cases, we find no evidence of asset-specific effects on educational outcomes of urban children and children from livestock producers. Results for boys vs. girls, and poor vs.
non-poor sub-samples are not presented here, but we find no evidence of differential effects in none of these cases. This indicates that while positive wealth effects on child education consistently holds in various scenarios, different types of assets have differential effects mostly among rural children and children from grain crop farmers. The results make a perfect sense in that the opportunity cost of schooling may not increase with agricultural assets if the household is not farming regardless of wealth status. In rural areas, labor markets are mostly absent and most households operate in agrarian settings so increased stock of agricultural assets increases opportunity cost of schooling.
Effects of assets on exam performance
We know from the earlier discussion that agricultural assets have negative effects on highest grade completed and the negative effects largely stem from child labor in agriculture because most agricultural assets are complement to child labor. While the 'highest grade completed' provides a valid measurement of school enrollment and grade completion, it still does not provide a measurement of individual performance in specific exams. We use the PSLE ratio to examine the effects of assets on school-age children's performance in the primary school leaving exam (Table 8) .
Similarly, FIVE ratio is used to assess the effects of assets on adolescent's performance in the form IV exam (Table 9 ). We still use the framework in equation (9) and estimate the same two model specifications, one with aggregated asset index and another with dis-aggregated indexes, using the random effects, fixed effects, and HTIV estimators but the analysis is carried out at the household level in contrast to individual level analysis for the highest grade completed. While the key variables of interest are still the same, the set of control covariates has been updated by deleting all individual level controls and adding some household level controls. 11 Results from the first specifications are not presented here, but as expected, we find positive wealth effects on children's performance in both PSLE and FIVE tests (See Table A3 and Table A4 in Appendix). Control variables are exactly the same in both specifications and the estimated coefficients on control variables from one specification are not qualitatively different from the other. Table 8 presents the estimated effects of asset holdings on the PLSE ratio, proportion of school-age children passing the PSLE exam. Results from the second specification, where the asset index is disaggregated to three sub-indexes, reveals that the positive wealth effect on PSLE performance mainly comes from household durables and housing quality assets. However, in contrast to the 'highest grade completed', PSLE performance is not affected by agricultural assets at all. These results are robust in that similar results hold for performance in the FIVE test as well. Table 9 indicate that like PSLE ratio, the aggregated wealth index has strong positive effect on FIVE ratio too. Again, the positive effect stems from effects of household durables and housing quality index, but agricultural assets have no effect on adolescent's performance in the FIVE test. This implies that the effect of agricultural assets is not homogenous among children from the same household and may depend on children's ability. To elaborate, children doing well in school may not be affected from agricultural assets as much because parents' expected returns from sending high ability children to school may be higher than the expected return from investment on low ability children's education. Because expected return from schooling is higher for high ability children, opportunity cost of schooling for high ability children may be not as high as compared to children performing poorly in school. As a consequence, children who were not doing well in school may have had no opportunity to take the tests because they might have been taken out of school for farm activities. Since increased agricultural assets may incentivize parents to take out low ability children from school, agricultural assets adversely affect the highest grade completed but do not affect test performance because children taking the tests are mostly high ability students.
Results in
Among other variables, household consumption expenditure has a strong positive effect on PSLE and FIVE ratios, suggesting positive income effect on child educational outcomes. Similarly, maximum parents' education has a positive effect on both ratios. Specifically, having a parent with one more level of education contributes to 7% increase in the ratio of PSLE pass children and 8% increase in the ratio of FIVE pass children. Unlike the effect on 'highest grade completed', having a school in village has no effect on children's performance on either test. An implication is that students who are doing well and still in school may find it worthwhile to travel to nearby community for schooling, but students who are not doing well may drop out when school is far away.
Conclusion
A large body of empirical evidence indicates that household wealth helps improve child education (Deng et al. 2014; Chowa et al. 2013; Huang 2013; Elliott, Destin and Friedline 2011; Kim and Sherraden 2011; Shanks 2007; Zhan and Sherraden 2003; Conley 2001) . Despite the positive effect of household wealth, there is extremely limited empirical evidence on how different components of the wealth (i.e. different assets) contribute to child education after controlling for household income. In this paper we developed a simple theoretical model that portrays a conceptual pathway for different types of assets to have differential effects on child education. Our model predicts, when labor market is perfect, increase in assets contributes to child education, but when labor market is missing, the effect of assets can go either way depending on types of assets and other conditions. Under the assumption of missing labor market, our empirical results confirmed the theoretical findings and revealed that different assets have differential effects on child education presumably through child labor.
We showed that agricultural assets have adverse effect on the highest grade completed but have no effect on performance in the primary school leaving exam and the form IV exam. This implies that agricultural assets may increase the opportunity cost of schooling for children but the increment may not be homogenous among siblings or other children in the same household. For children who are doing well in school, the opportunity cost of schooling is warranted because they have higher expected return from education than other children. As child schooling largely depends on parental decision about when and which child to send to school, parents may choose to take the low ability children out of school and invest more in high ability children's education. This is likely the case in many developing countries and it certainly leads to negative effect of agricultural assets on grade completed or school enrollment but no effect on school performance because children who are still in school are not affected by household's endowment of agricultural assets. That agricultural assets have negative effects on child education because they are labor using technology and increase opportunity cost of schooling is well justified with the evidence of larger negative effect of agricultural assets for children working in household agricultural activities. Our finding that the negative effects of agricultural assets is amplified for rural children or children of crop producers also backs up the evidence that the negative effect of agricultural assets operates through child labor in agriculture.
Household durable assets such as radio, TV, bicycle and housing quality assets such as better toilet facility, access to electricity, and good quality house have positive effects on both 'grade completed' and exam performance for children of age 6-18 and youth of age 18-24. Unlike agricultural assets, household durables and good quality housing are not labor using technology and they are unlikely to increase the opportunity cost of schooling. Instead, a large endowment of household durables and good hosing conditions are perceived as household wealth or higher socioeconomic status that contribute to better education for children via wealth effect. In addition, these assets may provide enhanced economic security and reduced economic stress among parents which usually leads to better child education through good parenting. The positive effect of housing quality assets is a part of wealth effect on child education, but some assets such as access to electricity, safe drinking water, and good toilet facility may have a direct effect on child education; electricity increases efficiency studying, and access to safe water and good toilet facilities may improve school performance through improved health of children.
Results imply that even though assets serve as a good predictor of child educational performance, asset based interventions that capitalize in agricultural assets may not be favorable for child education. From policy perspective, if child education is an intended goal of the intervention, transferring agricultural assets or other resources to build agricultural asset holding may not yield the desired result. In the context of Tanzania, program interventions that transfer livestock or help increase livestock herd size may be favorable for child education than providing other agricultural assets to crop producers and households in rural areas. Despite the potential negative effect of agricultural assets on child education, there may be ways to increase agricultural asset holdings without compromising child education. Since the negative effect of agricultural assets essentially boils down to child labor in agriculture, asset based intervention conditional on 'no child labor in agriculture' policy may help increase household welfare without hurting child education; although implementing such a policy may be extremely difficult. Another implication of our findings is that transferring agricultural assets in combination with awareness training or adult education to parents, or establishing a public school in the target community also may help mitigate the potential adverse effects of agricultural assets on child education.
Programs that help accumulate household durables or improve housing quality characteristics contribute to child education and therefore may be incorporated in policy interventions aiming to improve both household welfare and child education. Although policy interventions that transfer household durables or housing quality assets are rare in practice, empirical findings in this study suggest that interventions that combine agricultural asset transfers with household durables or housing quality assets may contribute to household socioeconomic status as well as temper the potential negative effect of agricultural assets on child education. Since we control for household income, our findings should still hold regardless of the level of household income.
One caveat is that this study does not consider the threshold level of income or asset holding above which change in asset ownership may have no effect on child education. In other words, if the demand for child education is inelastic to the opportunity cost of schooling, which may be the case for wealthy people, then our findings may not hold anymore. Otherwise, the effect of assets on child outcomes are based on type of assets and policy interventions that help accumulate assets or directly transfer assets should be implemented with caution.
Overall, the key implication of this study is that assets are an important element of social policies that focus on improving both household and individual welfare. The traditional method of considering all assets under household's possession as an aggregated measure of household wealth may be misleading because different type of assets have differential effects on child education and this may be true for other outcomes too. The evidence that, even after controlling for household income, asset holding has a significant positive effect on child education but the effect differs by the type of assets is a novel finding and deserves further exploration. If similar findings hold for other countries and contexts, it should help researchers and policymakers to design asset based interventions or all other policy interventions that help accumulate assets in a more meaningful way. †Number of observations of 'age started school' is much smaller than other variables because about 35% of the population has never attended school ‡Maximum parent's education is maximum education level of father or mother. It is coded as follows: 1= no education, 2= primary not finished, 3= primary, 4= secondary not finished, 5= secondary, and 6= higher than secondary. (Total expenditure) 0.036 *** 0.024 *** 0.031 *** (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Household durable index 0.018 *** 0.004 0.009 *** (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Agri. asset index -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Housing quality index 0.019 *** 0.009 * 0.015 *** (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) School in village 0.008 0.007 0.010 (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) Max parent's education 0.011 *** 0.077 *** (0.004) -(0.019) Head: age 0.001 *** 0.001 0.003 *** (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) Head: Gender (1=male, 0=female) -0.029 ** -0.033 -0.018 (0.013) (0.035) (0.013)
Household size -0.010 *** -0.000 -0.006 *** (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) Observations 5219 5219 5219 Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance level: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. As the dependent variable is at the household level, no individual characteristics are included in the model. Notes. All asset variables are in count, unless otherwise indicated. Asset indexes calculated by using binary indicators of asset ownership are not qualitatively different from the indexes resulting from count variables. Scoring factor is the weight that is used to calculate the first principal component. The first component explains 26% of the variance in durable assets Head: age 0.003 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 *** (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) Head: Gender (1=male, 0=female) -0.032 ** -0.072 *** -0.030 ** (0.013) (0.025) (0.014)
Household size -0.023 *** 0.002 -0.020 *** (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) Observations 6029 6029 6029 Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance level: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Household size -0.009 *** 0.000 -0.005 ** (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) Observations 5219 5219 5219 Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance level: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
